Welcome to India Juris, Antitrust and Competition Law Round-Up for the month of March 2025. For the ease of readers and to keep them updated on Indian legal position on the subject, we endeavour to provide summaries of orders/judgments passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Antitrust orders passed, and combinations approved by Competition Commission of India (CCI).
1. Order passed by NCLAT
(a) Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Competition Commission of India & Ors.
[Comp. Appeal (AT) No. 11 of 2021 & IA No. 2096 of 2021]
Date of the order: 21.03.2025
Facts
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) and Paradip Port Trust filed an information under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 against Respondents 2-7 alleging illegal cartelization among stevedoring contractors at Paradip Port from 2012 to 2016. SAIL, a government-owned company engaged in manufacturing steel, regularly imports coal and limestone through ports including Paradip. SAIL alleged that despite transparent open tender processes, illegal cartelization occurred among stevedoring agencies at the port. The information claimed that prior to 2016, a Management Committee of Stevedores consisting of only nine stevedores controlled the labour pool, creating a monopoly situation. In 2015, a new agency (Seaways Shipping and Logistics Ltd.) entered the market, which led to substantial reduction in cargo handling rates, benefiting all parties. The appellants alleged that two entities (Respondents 2 and 7) had common directors/management but submitted bids as separate legal entities. The information was filed based on advice from the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), which had recommended that appellants approach the Competition Commission of India (CCI).
Issues
✔️ Whether the CCI was correct in closing the information under Section 26(2) of the Act without directing investigation.
✔️ Whether the information filed under Section 19 should be treated as a reference under Section 21 of the Act.
✔️ Whether the appellants were entitled to a hearing before the CCI formed its prima facie opinion.
Judgement
The NCLAT concluded that the information provided did not meet the necessary criteria to warrant an investigation. The allegations were found to be lacking in key details, such as the nature of the alleged cartel, the members involved, how the cartel operated, the restrictions imposed under Section 3(3), and how the bids by SAIL were manipulated. The NCLAT emphasized that the informants should have gathered sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a cartel before filing the complaint. Additionally, the Appellants failed to explain why other members of the CFH Scheme were not included in the case. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and no further action was deemed necessary.
Thus, the NCLAT held that “In the absence of material particulars, the Commission cannot be called upon to make inquiry” and the same is not a fit case for interference and hence, the Appeal was dismissed.
2. Orders passed by CCI
(a) Fight Against Corruption (NGO) and Other Vs. Airports Authority of India and Others
[Case No. 12 of 2024]
Date of the order: 20.03.2025
The Informants i.e., Fight Against Corruption (‘Informant No. 1’) and Contractor Council of India (‘Informant No. 2’) filed Information under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘Act’) against Airports Authority of (‘OP 1’), Ministry of Civil Aviation (‘OP 2’), Delhi International Airport Limited (‘OP 3’), GMR Airports Limited (‘OP 4’) and Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide (‘OP 5’) (collectively referred herein as ‘Opposite Parties/OPs’) alleging contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act.
The Informant No. 1 is an NGO and the Informant No. 2 is a group of contractors’ and a third-party service provider engaged in providing construction services at Delhi and Indore airports. OP 3 is a joint venture, formed as a consortium between GMR Airports Limited, Airports Authority of India and Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide; OP 4 is a leading global airport platform company and OP 5 is a German transport company. As per the Informants, OP 4 entered into a joint sector agreement (‘JSA’) with the Government of India through the Secretary, MoCA for development, construction, operation and maintenance of Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi.
The Informants allege that OP-4, as a major shareholder in OP-3, is exploiting its dominant position and bypassing the competitive bidding process required by the Concessionaire Agreement. They claim OP-4 charges a 13% fee on tenders, particularly for Annual Maintenance Contracts (AMCs), which negatively affects other industry players’ profit margins. OP-4 is also accused of colluding with certain companies, particularly Tenaga Parking Services (TPSPL), to establish a new company, Delhi Airport Parking Services Limited (DAPSL), with a shareholding structure favoring OP-3 and OP-4. This, the Informants argue, limits market entry and violates the Concessionaire Agreement by depriving profits from the Government of India.
Additionally, concerns are raised about potential conflicts of interest involving Encalm, an entity responsible for lounge services at the airport, due to overlapping ownership and positions on the board of GMR.
The specific allegations against OP-4 are:
🔸 Creating a monopolistic environment and imposing high charges on customers (violating Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act).
🔸 Limiting service provision at Delhi Airport by ousting competitors (violating Section 4(2)(b)(i)).
🔸 Awarding contracts to its own companies by manipulating tender conditions (violating Section 4(2)(c)).
🔸 Engaging in exclusionary practices by leveraging its dominant position in the upstream market (violating Section 4(2)(e)).
The Commission concluded that OP-3 has the right to subcontract third parties for services like parking and lounge facilities under the OMDA Agreement, and that the selection processes for these services were competitive, with no conflicts of interest. The allegations regarding OP-3’s significant control over the entities providing these services were unsubstantiated. The Commission found no violation of Section 4 of the Act and closed the case, rejecting any relief requests. Additionally, it granted confidentiality to certain documents submitted by OP-3 and OP-4 for three years but clarified that the order itself is not confidential.
(b) Vinish Khanna And M/s A&T Europe SpA; M/s Myrtha Pools India Private Limited; Public Works Division Akola, Maharashtra
[Case No. 15/2024]
Date of the order: 21.03.2025
Sh. Vinish Khanna, in his individual capacity, has filed a complaint against M/s A&T Europe SpA (OP-1), M/s Myrtha Pools India Private Limited (OP-2), and Public Works Division Akola (OP-3) under Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. The complaint concerns a tender issued by OP-3 for constructing an Olympic-standard swimming pool, where restrictive conditions required bidders to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with OP-1 to be eligible. The Informant alleges this condition effectively forces bidders to use OP-1’s technology and materials, which violates competition rules. The complaint further claims that this setup creates a monopoly for OP-1, restricting fair competition and inflating material costs by 400%, thus wasting public money. The Informant argues that OP-3 abused its dominant position by manipulating the tender process, favouring OP-1 and limiting access for other suppliers.
In response to the allegations made by the Informant, OP-3 denied any anti-competitive conduct in the tender process for constructing a swimming pool. OP-3 explained that the project aims to create a world-class Olympic standard pool and that pre-engineered technology, such as PVC-coated stainless-steel panels, was chosen after evaluating various options. OP-3 emphasized that the tender allowed multiple qualified firms to participate and that the inclusion of OP-1’s technology was not intended to favour a single supplier. The Commission found no evidence of anti-competitive behaviour under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Competition Act, and therefore, the case was closed, and the request for relief was rejected.
(c) Chakra R Prabhakaran vs. Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation Limited
[Case no. 02/2024]
Date of the order: 25.03.2025
The Informant, Chakra R Prabakaran, has filed a complaint under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002, against Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation Limited (TASMAC), alleging a contravention of Section 4 of the Act. TASMAC, a state-owned company, has exclusive rights to sell alcoholic products through over 5000 retail outlets in Tamil Nadu. The Informant claims that TASMAC is restricting competition by only selling certain beer brands, like “SNJ 10000” and “British Empire,” produced by specific breweries, thereby impeding the market access of other beer brands. The Informant further alleges that TASMAC has formed an exclusive nexus with certain breweries, limiting opportunities for other brands to compete in the market.
The Commission, based on the data provided by TASMAC, observes that only a few beer brands dominate its procurement, while well-known brands have a significantly lower share. This suggests that TASMAC may be abusing its dominant position by limiting market access to certain beer brands in Tamil Nadu, potentially violating Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act. Given the substance of the allegations, the Commission has directed the Director General (DG) to investigate the matter and submit a report within 60 days.
(d) XYZ And Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft Corporation (India) Private Limited
[Case no. 03/2024]
Date of the order: 03.03.2025
The Informant has filed a complaint under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002, against Microsoft Corporation (OP-1) and its Indian subsidiary, Microsoft Corporation (India) Private Limited (OP-2), alleging a violation of Section 4 of the Act. The Informant claims that since the release of Windows 10 in 2015, Microsoft has bundled its antivirus software, Microsoft Defender, with the operating system, making it mandatory for Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to include it. The Informant further asserts that third-party antivirus developers face significant barriers, such as restricted access to essential features like real-time protection and automatic updates, which are only available to the default antivirus. The Informant identifies key challenges, including onerous agreements to access Microsoft’s Antimalware API, limited entry through the Microsoft Store, and functionality restrictions that hinder competition from third-party antivirus developers.
The Informant alleges that Microsoft is abusing its dominant position in the market by pre-installing and setting Microsoft Defender as the default antivirus on Windows OS, thereby excluding potentially more efficient competitors. The Informant claims that Microsoft gains sensitive data through its Microsoft Virus Initiative (MVI) program, using this data to enhance its own product, making it difficult for third-party antivirus developers to compete. The Informant argues that Microsoft is violating multiple sections of the Competition Act, including by tying and bundling Microsoft Defender with Windows, hindering rival software developers’ market access, and leveraging its dominance in desktop operating systems to protect its position in the antivirus market. The Informant requests the Commission to direct Microsoft to cease these practices and ensure fair access for competing antivirus software developers.
Issues:
✔️Does the inclusion of Microsoft Defender with the Windows operating system constitute an imposition of an unfair condition by Microsoft, thereby violating Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act?
✔️Has Microsoft’s conduct resulted in an impediment to technical and scientific development in the market for antivirus applications, thereby violating Section 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Act?
✔️Does Microsoft’s conduct of bundling its own security software, Microsoft Defender, with the Windows Operating System violate Section 4(2)(d) of the Act?
✔️Has Microsoft leveraged its dominant position in the market for operating systems for personal computers in India to safeguard its position in the market for computer security (antivirus) software for Windows OS, thereby violating Section 4(2)(e) of the Act?
✔️Has Microsoft restricted the development and market access of rival security software developers by making MVI membership a mandatory requirement for listing in the Microsoft Store thereby violating Section 4(2)(c) of the Act?
Judgement
Following are the conclusions made by the Commission:
🔹 Users are free to install third-party antivirus software, either through the internet or Microsoft Store, and can replace Microsoft Defender with another solution. If a third-party antivirus is registered for real-time protection, Microsoft Defender will disable its own real-time protection. Additionally, OEMs can pre-install alternative antivirus software on Windows devices. Thus, there appears to be no violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act, as there is no compulsion or imposition on users.
🔹 Other operating system providers are also rolling out new security features, indicating that the cyber security and OS sectors remain dynamic. Microsoft’s submissions clarify that it does not access privileged information from other antivirus programs. As a result, the allegations regarding impediments to development appear speculative, and there is no prima facie violation of Section 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
🔹 The Commission disagrees with Microsoft’s view that Microsoft Defender is just a core security feature of Windows OS, as antivirus software is a distinct market with independent manufacturers. It has determined that Microsoft holds a dominant position in the antivirus software market for Windows OS. The first two conditions for anti-competitive tying, separate products and dominance are met. However, Microsoft’s claim that there is no coercion on users to use Microsoft Defender, and the availability of alternative antivirus solutions, suggests the third condition is not fulfilled. Additionally, there is no evidence of market foreclosure, as major antivirus providers like Symantec, Bitdefender, Norton, McAfee, and AVG remain active in the market and continue to compete. Therefore, the Commission finds no violation under Section 4(2)(d) of the Act.
🔹 The Commission notes that for a charge of leveraging to hold, there must be evidence of active restrictions or conditions. In this case, there is no evidence that Microsoft has imposed any mandatory conditions on users regarding the use of Microsoft Defender. Consumers are free to install and use third-party antivirus software without barriers. Furthermore, the cyber security market remains competitive with many established players. Therefore, the allegation that Microsoft leveraged its dominance in the operating system market to protect its position in the antivirus market under Section 4(2)(e) of the Act is not substantiated.
The Commission finds no evidence of a contravention of Section 4 of the Act and concludes that there is no prima facie case. As a result, the information filed is ordered to be closed under Section 26(2) of the Act.
(e) Kuldeepsinh Mahendrasinh Jadeja and Pragyawan Technologies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
[Case No. 30 0f 2024]
Date of the order: 03.03.2025
The Information has been filed by Shri Kuldeepsinh Mahendrasinh Jadeja under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002, alleging that Pragyawan Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (OP-1) and KLN Engineering Pvt. Ltd. (OP-2) violated Section 3(3) of the Act in relation to tenders published by the National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. (OP-4), the Nodal Agency of the Ministry of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (OP-3), on the Government e-Marketplace (OP-5) for the procurement of Toolkits under the Pradhan Mantri Vishwakarma Yojana. The scheme, launched on 17.09.2023, provides support to artisans and craftspeople in 18 trades. On 27.04.2024, OP-4 issued a Notice Inviting Proposal (NIP) on behalf of OP-3 to select vendors for the supply of Toolkits, with 18 Request for Proposals (RFPs) published on the Central Public Procurement Portal. The allegations made by the Informant are as follows:
🔸 Non-publication of the Notice Inviting Proposal (NIP) by OP-3 and OP-4 on OP-5, violating the General Financial Rules (GFR) 2017;
🔸 Cartelization, bid-rigging, and collusive bidding by OP-1 and OP-2, with involvement from OP-3 and OP-4;
🔸 Relaxation of eligibility criteria in favor of OP-1 by OP-3 and OP-4; and (d) OP-1 qualifying in certain RFPs despite not meeting the eligibility criteria.
The Informant has also requested interim relief, including directions to OP-3, OP-4, and OP-5 to keep the results of the financial evaluation of 8 remaining RFPs in a sealed cover and not declare L1 and L2 for those RFPs.
The Commission notes that while OP-1 has been declared technically qualified in multiple RFPs, it has not been the L1 bidder in any of the RFPs where the financial evaluation results have been declared. There is no evidence of collusion between OP-1 and OP-2, as they are separate companies with no common directors or key personnel. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there is no prima facie case of contravention of Section 3 of the Act. As a result, the matter is closed under Section 26(2) of the Act, and I.A. No. 333 of 2024 is also disposed off.
(f) Moses Pinto Vs. Victor Hospital
[Case No. 29 of 2024]
Date of the order: 03.03.2025
Facts:
Moses Pinto (Informant) was admitted to Victor Hospital (Opposite Party/OP) on 01.08.2023 for surgery due to acute appendicitis. The surgery (Laparoscopic Appendectomy) was performed by Dr. P. Ravi Teja. Following the surgery, the Informant experienced complications, including abdominal pain, infection, and the development of an enterocutaneous fistula. The Informant later filed a complaint with the Goa Medical Council, which found that Dr. Ravi Teja did not have valid registration with the Goa Medical Council at the time of surgery. Despite this, Victor Hospital continued to employ him, misleading patients about his credentials. The Informant argued that Victor Hospital’s actions, including the promotion of an unregistered surgeon as qualified, distorted consumer choice, misled patients, and created an unfair competitive advantage over other compliant healthcare providers in Margao, South Goa. The Informant sought the following relief: requested that:
🔸 Victor Hospital ceases promoting or employing Dr. Ravi Teja.
🔸 Penalties be imposed on Victor Hospital for anti-competitive practices.
🔸 Ensure compliance with regulatory requirements for employing qualified medical professionals.
🔸 Interim relief to prevent the promotion of unregistered practitioners until the inquiry concludes.
Issues:
✔️Whether Victor Hospital violated Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, by misrepresenting Dr. Ravi Teja’s qualifications, misleading consumers, and distorting competition in the healthcare market.
✔️Whether the hospital’s actions resulted in anti-competitive practices by creating an unfair market advantage and eroding consumer choice.
Judgment
The Commission, after reviewing the case, concluded that there was no prima-facie evidence to support that Victor Hospital’s actions violated the Competition Act, specifically Sections 3 and 4. The alleged misleading of consumers through misrepresentation and false advertising by Victor Hospital did not raise competition issues under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the case was closed under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, and the Informant’s requested reliefs, including interim relief, were not granted.
(g) XYZ And Aegis Logistics Ltd, Indus Petro Chem Ltd. & Sea Lord Containers Ltd.
[Case No. 07 of 2024]
Date of the order: 03.03.2025
Facts:
NMPT issued a tender for leasing land for storage facilities. The Informant alleged that the OPs, belonging to the same group with common directors, colluded in the tender process, resulting in bid rigging. The original tender was cancelled, and a re-tender (Impugned Tender) was issued. The Informant claimed the OPs acted identically in both tenders, despite being separate entities. OP-3 is a wholly owned subsidiary of OP-1. The Chief Operating Officer/Chief Executive Officer of OP-1, Mr. Sudhir Malhotra and his family own 99% of shares in OP-2. NMPT clarified that the original tender was cancelled to enhance competition, not due to vigilance complaints. In the Impugned Tender only OP-3 and one other bidder participated in the final e-auction. NMPT stated the OPs are independent legal entities. The informant asked for penalties, a ban on the OPs from future tenders, and cancellation of the allotment to OP-3.
Issue:
- Whether the OPs colluded and engaged in bid rigging in the NMPT tender, violating Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, 2002.
- Whether the fact that the companies are related, in itself, is enough to prove collusion.
Judgment:
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) found no sufficient evidence of bid rigging. The CCI stated that merely being related companies, without evidence of actual collusion, is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Competition Act. The CCI referenced prior cases, stating that common directors or ownership alone does not prove bid rigging. The CCI accepted the NMPT’s statement that the OPs were independent legal entities. The Commission closed the matter under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002.
(h) XYZ Vs. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti and Other
[Case No. 25 of 2024]
Date of the order: 03.03.2025
Facts:
NVS, an autonomous body under the Ministry of Education, appointed RailTel as the Project Management Consultant (PMC) for implementing IT solutions in Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya (JNV) schools under the PM SHRI scheme. RailTel, a PSU, was awarded a work order of Rs. 162.73 crores by NVS. RailTel subsequently issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for selecting a partner for this project. The Informant alleged that NVS’s selection of RailTel was unfair and non-transparent, as RailTel lacked prior experience in the PM SHRI scheme. The Informant also alleged that RailTel’s RFP had stringent and arbitrary technical specifications, designed to exclude potential bidders, and that the RFP was very vague.
The Informant claimed violations of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. The Informant requested the CCI to declare the Ops’ conduct anti-competitive, order them to cease such conduct, impose penalties, and grant interim relief to halt the bidding process and also, requested confidentiality.
Issues:
- Whether NVS abused its dominant position by unfairly selecting RailTel as the PMC (Section 4 of the Act).
- Whether RailTel abused its dominant position by issuing a restrictive and faulty RFP (Section 4 of the Act).
- Whether there was a tacit agreement between NVS and RailTel, constituting a violation of Section 3 of the Act.
- Whether the CCI should grant interim relief to halt the bidding process.
Judgment:
The CCI found no prima facie case of contravention of either Section 3 or Section 4 of the Competition Act. Regarding Section 3, the CCI stated that the Informant provided no evidence of a tacit agreement or bid-rigging. Regarding Section 4, the CCI held that the mere selection of a PMC or issuance of an RFP, even if flawed, does not automatically constitute abuse of dominance. The CCI stated that the procurer has the freedom to set its own terms and conditions.
The CCI emphasized that a consumer/procurer has the right to exercise free choice in procurement. The CCI rejected the Informant’s request for interim relief. The CCI ordered the Information to be closed under Section 26(2) of the Act. The CCI granted the Informant’s request for confidentiality for three years.
3. Order passed by CCI on Combination
(a) NHIT Southern Projects Private Limited
[Combination Registration C-2025/03/125]
Dated- 17.03.2025
The proposed combination involves the acquisition of concession rights over 11 road projects owned by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) by NHIT Southern Projects Private Limited (“Acquirer”). The acquisition is part of the Toll-Operate-Transfer (TOT) model for a 20-year concession period. The Acquirer is a subsidiary of National Highway Infrastructure Trust (NHIT), a privately listed Infrastructure Investment Trust (InvIT) sponsored by NHAI.
There is no business activities associated with the Target Assets, as they are part of the Government of India’s national road portfolio. The Acquirer and the Target Assets do not have any horizontal, vertical, or complementary relationships in India, meaning the proposed combination does not pose any competition concerns. As a result, the combination is being filed under the Green Channel route, as per the Competition Act, 2002, with the Competition Commission of India.
(b) BCSS IOTA (A) and LLC
[Combination Registration C-2025/03/1259]
Dated- 20.03.2025
The proposed transaction involves the acquisition of approximately 51.26% shareholding in a newly formed HoldCo by BCSS Iota (A), LLC (“Acquirer”) from Milacron LLC (“Seller”). The HoldCo will own 100% of Milacron Marketing Company LLC, which operates the Target Business- focused on manufacturing and selling injection molding and extrusion equipment, along with related aftermarket parts and services.
The Acquirer is controlled by Bain Capital Credit Members. The Target Business is carried out by Milacron India Private Limited, which will become a wholly owned subsidiary of the HoldCo after the transaction.
There are no horizontal overlaps or vertical/complementary relationships between the parties in India, meaning the transaction does not raise any competition concerns. As a result, the transaction is being filed under the Green Channel route with the Competition Commission of India in accordance with the Competition Act, 2002.
(c) Kotak Strategic Situations India Fund II and Kotak Alternate Asset Managers Limited
Combination Registration No. C-2025/03/1265
Dated- 25.03.2025
The proposed combination involves the following parties:
- Acquirer 1: Kotak Strategic Situations India Fund II
- Acquirer 2: Kotak Alternate Asset Managers Limited (investment manager for Acquirer 1)
- Target: Ace Designers Limited
The Acquirers plan to acquire shareholding in Ace Designers through equity shares and compulsorily convertible debentures. The combination is a financial investment in line with Acquirer 1’s investment objectives and is expected to generate favourable returns. The funds raised by Ace Designers through this combination will be used for expanding its operations.
Products and Services:
- Acquirer 1 is an alternative investment fund (AIF) managed by Acquirer 2, which also manages multiple AIFs in India.
- Ace Designers is a public limited company involved in manufacturing CNC machines, metal components, precision assemblies for machine tools, and precision tools.
Market Impact: There are no horizontal, vertical, or complementary overlaps between the activities of the parties in India, indicating no competition concerns. The transaction is being filed under the Green Channel route as per the Competition Act, 2002.
Disclaimer: The information published in the above newsletter is collected from various sources in electronic medium and analyzed by the firm. The reader is advised to consult the attorney qualified in their jurisdiction, before acting on any information contained in this newsletter. India Juris excepts no liability what so ever in this regard.
